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Impeachment was inserted into the Constitution of the United States
as a tool of national self-preservation. Although its most common use has
been as a quotidian house-cleaning device for dispensing with corrupt or
egregiously unsuitable federal judges otherwise unfireable due to life
tenure, the American framers conceived impeachment’s real and essential
function to be the ejection and permanent electoral disqualification of any
president who proved grievously unfit or exhibited a dangerous
disposition to autocracy.
This symposium was convened under the somewhat anodyne title,
“The Two Impeachments of Donald J. Trump.” But the central problem
at the heart of our discussion is that, when confronted with a president who
proved himself grossly unsuitable by temperament, capacity, and conduct
for his office, who consistently abused its powers for personal and political
gain, and who, at the last, overtly sought the overthrow of constitutional
order, Congress flinched. Not once, but twice. In short, impeachment
failed to accomplish the principal thing it was put in the Constitution to
do.
At this point, a reader of an insistently non-partisan temper might
contend that I am assuming a constitutional conclusion for which I ought
to offer proof—to wit, that Donald Trump was factually guilty of “high
Crimes and Misdemeanors” and ought to have been convicted, twice, by
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the United States Senate. To which hypothetical interlocutor I would have
two responses:
First, I have laid out the case for convicting former President Trump
in both of his impeachments at length in other venues, and I invite the
curious reader to survey my reasons at leisure.1 Second, given the
undisputed facts of both cases, I have no patience with anyone who would
now argue that Donald Trump ought not to have been convicted, excluded
from the presidency, and disqualified from any future office of honor or
profit under the government of the United States.
Not only did Mr. Trump employ the powers of the chief magistracy
to extort personal political favors from an ally in peril of losing its national
existence to a state long hostile to America itself, he then schemed for
months to nullify the results of a properly-conducted national election he
lost in order to make himself, literally, an unelected autocrat. Those are
not tendentious partisan allegations. They are facts, indisputable by any
candid mind.2

See, e.g., Frank O. Bowman, III, Trump’s Extortion of Ukraine Is an
Impeachable Abuse of Power, JUST SECURITY (Oct. 3, 2019),
https://www.justsecurity.org/66407/trumps-extortion-of-ukraine-is-an-impeachableabuse-of-power/ [https://perma.cc/6QVK-NRLJ]; Frank O. Bowman, III, Foreign
Policy Has Always Been at the Heart of Impeachment, FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Nov. 25,
2019),
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2019-11-25/foreign-affairs-hasalways-been-heart-impeachment [https://perma.cc/R25U-Y2KE]; Frank O. Bowman,
III, Constitutional Crabgrass: President Trump’s Defenders Distort the Impeachment
Clause, JUST SECURITY (Jan. 24, 2020), https://www.justsecurity.org/68240/
constitutional-crabgrass-president-trump-defenders-distort-the-impeachmentclauses-frank-bowman-high-crimes-misdemeanors/ [https://perma.cc/P2B9-VBGR];
Frank O. Bowman, III, The Constitutional Case for Impeaching Donald Trump
(Again), JUST SECURITY (Jan. 8, 2021), https://www.justsecurity.org/74127/theconstitutional-case-for-impeaching-donald-trump-again/
[https://perma.cc/Z772D256]; Frank O. Bowman, III, What the Founders Would Have Done With Trump,
WASHINGTON MONTHLY (Jan. 18, 2021), https://washingtonmonthly.com/2021/01/
18/what-the-founders-would-have-done-with-trump/
[https://perma.cc/GAJ6NMBQ]; The Constitutionality of Trying a Former President Impeached While in
Office, LAWFARE (Feb. 3, 2021), https://www.lawfareblog.com/constitutionalitytrying-former-president-impeached-while-office [https://perma.cc/7Z56-B7QB].
2
For the facts underlying Trump’s first impeachment, see The Trump-Ukraine
Impeachment Inquiry, REPORT OF THE HOUSE PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON
INTELLIGENCE, PURSUANT TO H. RES. 660 IN CONSULTATION WITH THE HOUSE
COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND REFORM AND THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN
AFFAIRS 40–41 (Dec. 2019), https://ia803104.us.archive.org/15/items/6566077House-Intelligence-Committee-impeachment-inquiry/6566077-House-IntelligenceCommittee-impeachment-inquiry.pdf [https://perma.cc/B329-L8R3]. For the facts
underlying the second Trump impeachment, see Jerrold Nadler, REPORT BY THE
MAJORITY STAFF OF THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, MATERIALS IN
SUPPORT OF H. RES. 24, IMPEACHING DONALD JOHN TRUMP, PRESIDENT OF THE
UNITED STATES FOR HIGH CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS (Jan. 2021),
1
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When all but one of the senators of his own party ignored the plain
facts of the first impeachment case against President Trump, they opened
the door to his entirely predictable effort at sedition following the 2020
election, of which the assault on the United States Capitol was only a
dramatic, if tragic, incident. Given a second chance, all but seven senators
of his own party ignored not merely President Trump’s prolonged, overt,
and unapologetic plot to subvert democracy, but an actual invasion of their
own workplace that sent them fleeing for their lives.3 The “not guilty”
senators of the second impeachment tacitly (and in some cases explicitly)
condoned Trump’s behavior; they lent credence to the insidious lie that the
2020 election had been “stolen,” thereby abetting the deeply corrosive
campaign (ongoing to this day) to impugn the integrity of the American
electoral system; and they left open the possibility that Donald Trump
could again assume the presidency, an event American constitutional
democracy would be unlikely to survive.4
At the time of his second impeachment, I wrote of Donald Trump that
he was the demagogue for whom the Framers inserted impeachment into
the constitution, and “the man against whom the founding generation
armed the constitution with the disqualification clause.”5 Yet, even when
wielded – precisely as the Framers intended – against the personification
of the Framers’ nightmares, impeachment failed.
The question is why. And what it means for our constitutional future.
What we have witnessed since Donald Trump gained the White
House is a modern iteration of the ancient struggle that gave rise to the
impeachment mechanism in Britain. The original contest pitted
royalism – the rule of the one – against the emergent ideas of a dispersion
of power among multiple centers of authority and of the supremacy of law.
Impeachment was invented in 1376 to give the English Parliament a
https://judiciary.house.gov/uploadedfiles/house_judiciary_committee_report__materials_in_support_of_h._res._24.pdf [https://perma.cc/97J5-LQFW].
3
United States Senate, Roll Call Vote 117th Congress, 1st Session, Question:
Guilty or Not Guilty (Article of Impeachment Against Former President Donald John
Trump) (Feb. 13, 2021), https://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_votes/
vote1171/vote_117_1_00059.htm [https://perma.cc/APX8-B6C5].
4
I think it fair to add that, taken together, the failure of Trump’s impeachments
suggested to foreign observers both a nation in political decline and a political
establishment that no longer shared a bipartisan commitment to America’s European
friends and allies, or indeed to the security structure that has maintained stability in
Europe since 1945. It is not unreasonable to suppose that the perception of both
national weakness and an isolationist mood contributed to Vladimir Putin’s recent
choice to challenge the West with his invasion of Ukraine.
5
Frank O. Bowman, III, What the Founders Would Have Done with Trump: An
originalist case for trying, convicting and disqualifying a president after he or she
leaves office, WASH. MONTHLY (Jan. 16, 2021), https://washingtonmonthly.com/
2021/01/18/what-the-founders-would-have-done-with-trump/
[https://perma.cc/TH3X-JFQQ].
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weapon to counter the monarchy’s will to absolute power. It played a
central role in the 1600s, the era of the Stuart kings—whose theory of
kingship was that the source of all law was the royal will. Lawyers and
judges in Parliament (notably Sir Edward Coke) insisted to the contrary
that the sources of law are reason and nature as expounded by judges, and
the positive enactments of the legislature. When James I, and later his son
Charles, insisted too stridently on royal absolutism, Parliament impeached
the ministers who were the agents of that policy. When impeachments
proved insufficient to dissuade Charles of his divine right to personal rule,
Civil War followed, Charles knelt beneath the headsman’s axe, and
Cromwell’s kingless Commonwealth arose.6
America’s founders wanted no kings. They crafted a constitutional
government with Congress at its center. They created the office of
president, but expected it to be relatively weak and naturally subordinate
to the legislature. However, they were wise enough to recognize that the
presidency might swell beyond their original conception and that, in any
case, a corrupt or demagogic president might arise and endanger
constitutional order. Therefore, they created an array of constraints on
presidential power. These were of two kinds: First, the institutional
controls of our tripartite government and its checks and balances, and
second, two mechanisms for presidential removal—elections as periodic
popular judgments on presidential performance and impeachment for the
rare case of grievous misconduct or a grasp for dictatorship.
The Framers’ impeachment is a curious construction. They defined
the category of impeachable conduct broadly but limited the punishments
narrowly—to mere removal and potential future disqualification. That
should have made conviction easy. But they also imposed a two-thirds
majority requirement in the Senate, which in practice raised a towering
barrier to conviction, at least of presidents.7
In over two centuries of American history, only three presidents –
Andrew Johnson, Bill Clinton, and Donald Trump – have ever been
impeached, and not one has been convicted. That record of apparent
impotence has led some to suggest that the impeachment mechanism
written into the constitution was doomed from the start as a practical
remedy for presidential misbehavior.
I think that overstates the case. For most of our history,
impeachment, or the latent threat of its use, served a salutary restraining
function. Only in the peculiar circumstances of our present era – to which
we will return momentarily – has it become a hollow threat.

6
For a description of the development of impeachment in Great Britain, see
FRANK O. BOWMAN, III, HIGH CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS: A HISTORY OF
IMPEACHMENT FOR THE AGE OF TRUMP 22–49 (2019).
7
For a discussion of the Framers’ debates on impeachment, see id., at 80–111.
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It is true that, even at the Republic’s beginning, presidential
impeachment was a less efficacious tool than the Framers likely intended.
The Framers’ textual hurdle of a two-thirds vote to convict in the Senate
very early combined with the emergence of a strong national two-party
system in which members of Congress allied with presidents of their own
party to make conviction of a president very difficult.
It is often noted that many of the constitution’s drafters distrusted
parties and party politics – which they were wont to disparage as the vice
of “faction” – and hoped that national parties would not form or at least
would not feature largely in national government. Of course, it is equally
often observed that, within a handful of years after ratification, the Framers
were nearly all neck-deep in party politics. Even so, the separation of
powers design of the constitution rested in part on the prediction that,
regardless of party affiliation, officers in each of the three branches would
be jealous of the institutional prerogatives of their own branch and would
therefore hasten to check overly exuberant assertions of authority by
representatives of the other branches. Congress, in particular, was thought
by the founding generation to be the naturally dominant institution, with
the president as a dependent partner. The two-thirds rule for impeachment
is a manifestation of concern that presidents not become mere creatures of
the legislature, readily cowed by the threat of easy impeachment and
removal.
However, the anticipated inter-branch power dynamic was long ago
reversed, with presidents assuming both the mantle of national party
leadership and ever-growing practical powers largely independent of
Congress. This development made successful impeachment less likely.
Presidential aspirants are unlikely be elected if the national balance of
political forces is such that in the same election, or even in the ensuing
midterm, the opposing party can secure a two-thirds supermajority in the
Senate. The only instance of this alignment of which I am aware is the
extraordinary situation of Andrew Johnson, who had been selected as
Abraham Lincoln’s running mate in 1864 precisely because he was not a
Republican, but a so-called War Democrat. When he succeeded to the
presidency after Lincoln’s assassination, Republicans – of various
idiosyncratic flavors – held roughly 80% of the seats in the Senate.8
Absent such a rare circumstance, an impeached president can only be
convicted if all senators of the opposing party and a significant number of
senators of his own party vote against him. And in Johnson’ case,
impeachment nonetheless failed, albeit by only a single vote.9 That said,

8
See Impeachment Trial of President Andrew Johnson, 1868, SENATE.GOV,
https://www.senate.gov/about/powers-procedures/impeachment/impeachmentjohnson.htm [https://perma.cc/38K7-QZM2] (last visited Sept. 10, 2022).
9
Id.
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the two-thirds rule has not, in my view, been an insuperable barrier to
conviction until our present unhappy era.
For example, Johnson’s acquittal had nothing to do with sticky party
loyalties. It was instead the result of a complex set of circumstances
peculiar to the time and the case. And in any event, Johnson’s
impeachment accomplished a good deal from the point of view of his
congressional opponents. The conduct that led to his impeachment
alienated important figures like national hero General U.S. Grant. Facing
removal, Johnson modified some of the most objectionable features of the
Reconstruction policies that were the real cause of his impeachment. And
the impeachment proceedings paralyzed the final year of Johnson’s
administration and put the quietus on his hopes of becoming a serious
candidate for a second term.10
Moreover, for much of the country’s history, and certainly from the
Reconstruction period following the Civil War until very recently, the
opposing parties were not ideologically harmonious national bodies, but
rather coalitions of regional and factional interests. The Democratic Party
of the mid-to-late twentieth century was home to both white southern
segregationists, large chunks of the urban working class, activist social
democrats, and, increasingly, African Americans.
Likewise, the
Republican Party of the same period welcomed both insistent social
conservatives like Barry Goldwater, centrist pragmatists like Dwight D.
Eisenhower, and a large, influential moderate-to-liberal wing represented
by figures like Oregon’s Mark Hatfield, Maine’s Margaret Chase Smith,
New York’s Jacob Javits, and Lowell Weicker of Connecticut. Moreover,
the Congress of this long era was a practical, problem-solving body. Its
members viewed themselves, not as solo media influencers – a category
they could not in any case have imagined – but as practitioners of the art
of legislation, a craft requiring practical knowledge of government and the
world and skill in negotiation and compromise.
A Congress composed and operating in this way was capable of both
impeaching and convicting an erring president of either party. We know
this because, although Richard Nixon was neither formally impeached by
the whole House nor convicted by the Senate, he resigned precisely
because impeachment in the House was imminent, and the senior
Republicans in Congress came down to the White House and told him he
would be convicted by the Senate even though Democrats would cast only
56 of the 67 necessary votes.11 Without impeachment, there would have
10
See BRENDA WINEAPPLE, THE IMPEACHERS: THE TRIAL OF ANDREW JOHNSON
AND THE DREAM OF A JUST NATION 346, 404-05 (2019); Brian C. Kalt, Impeachment
vs. Censure: Constitutional Law, Politics, and the Art of the Possible, THE
CONSTITUTIONALIST (Jan. 19, 2021), https://theconstitutionalist.org/2021/01/19/

impeachment-vs-censure-constitutional-law-politics-and-the-art-of-the-possible
[https://perma.cc/VB2D-4DL3].
11
Id.
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been no mechanism to force Nixon’s ouster, and that famously combative
man would surely have clung to office. In sum, Nixon’s case proved that,
as recently as the early years of my young adulthood, impeachment could
work exactly as the Framers intended. A crooked president who misused
the powers of his office was evicted from the White House.
Nor is the acquittal of President William Jefferson Clinton in 1999
evidence of the necessary impotence of impeachment in the face of the
two-thirds rule. Clinton was impeached by the House on two counts—one
of perjury and the other of obstruction of justice. Neither count received
even a majority in a Senate in which Republicans held a 55-45 majority.
Ten Republicans voted to acquit on perjury and five on obstruction. In
short, Clinton’s impeachment was unsuccessful, not because the loyalty of
his fellow Democrats prevented the accumulation of the two-thirds
requirement of 67, but because the case against him failed to convince
even many of his Republican political adversaries.
The Clinton affair, however, was an early marker of an incipient
deterioration of American public life to its current condition of poisonous
division and governmental dysfunction. To fully describe either our
present distressing political circumstances or their causes is far beyond the
scope of this brief essay. It may be sufficient to note three points.
First, the two contending national parties no longer resemble their
historical, or even fairly recent, incarnations. They are, as has been often
remarked, increasingly ideologically homogenous, with decreasing
overlap between the policy positions of the centrists in the two parties. But
even that characterization does not quite capture the nature of the
transformation. The two groups have become not so much ideological as
cultural affinities—increasingly visceral, increasingly emotional,
increasingly tribal. This transformation extends into the elected
representatives of the two groups, perhaps most corrosively into Congress.
In the House of Representatives particularly the cultural movement to
political tribalism is exacerbated by increasingly effective legislative
gerrymandering that awards most members near-guaranteed incumbency
vulnerable only to primary challengers from the extreme flanks of their
own parties. The result is a Congress where the traditional ethos of
negotiation and compromise in pursuit of legislative accomplishment has
been replaced by ideological rigidity, reflexive intransigence, and rising
personal rancor.
Second, the media are no longer an identifiable set of discrete
national, regional, and local institutions with reasonably robust
professional quality control mechanisms. Rather, in the internet age,
information sources have proliferated, becoming decreasingly
professional and increasingly partisan. The result is a public that
increasingly experiences politics, and reality itself, from the inside of
separate, non-intersecting informational silos.
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The current media ecosystem may be the greatest contributor to our
present political dysfunction. All effective government work in pursuit of
the common good, particularly legislative action, depends at bottom on
society’s capacity to arrive at a general, if not necessarily unanimous,
consensus about the real state of the world. Today’s media not only
present disparate realities to different audiences but have corroded public
faith in the reliability of information from virtually every other institution.
The elected leaders of tribal political parties are increasingly reluctant to
make hard choices for the general good when the constituencies they
represent acrimoniously disagree over both basic questions of fact and the
trustworthiness of the institutions traditionally charged with resolving
those questions. This is particularly true in the case of presidential
impeachment, where congressional choices will either sustain or dismiss
the head of one contending political tribe.
Third, candor compels me to note that the degeneration of American
political culture, though by no means confined entirely to one side of the
spectrum, is markedly more advanced on the political right. The sad truth
is that, since the election of Donald Trump to the presidency, the
Republican Party has become not so much a narrowly ideological party as
a cult of personality. As illustrated by the current travails of
Congresswoman Liz Cheney – dynastic successor to the legacy of her
pugilistic hard-right father, Dick Cheney, and herself one of the most
fervent ideological conservatives in public life – loyalty to the leader is
now almost all that matters among Republicans. And as one looks beyond
the Trump period, the behavior and pronouncements of his would-be
successors suggest a movement far advanced on the path to a more general
authoritarianism. I do not ascribe this fact to any inherent disparity in
virtue between liberals and conservatives. If modern history teaches
anything, it is that dictatorships spring equally nimbly from left and right.
But, for now, the acute danger comes from the right.
What does all this have to do with impeachment?
First, the degraded state of American political culture explains the
two acquittals of Donald Trump. Impeachment is not, and never has been,
a self-contained automatic mechanism that, once provided with the
required type and quantum of data (proof of “Treason, Bribery, or other
high Crimes and Misdemeanors”), will autonomously remove the diseased
and dangerous member of the national government. Impeachment is not
even a legal process in the sense that criminal or civil trials in the regular
courts are legal.
Rather, impeachment is, and was designed to be, a political remedy
for the quintessentially political problem presented by the ascension to the
presidency of a grievous misfit, a criminal, or an aspiring autocrat.
Because the Framers judged that not all variations of presidential
misconduct could be either foreseen or meticulously described in
constitutional language, the definition of impeachable behavior was
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consciously made both broad and elastic. Still more critically, the Framers
also recognized that the choice to remove a head of state is not like a
criminal jury’s decision on whether a list of designated elements has been
proven. Rather, presidential impeachment necessarily requires balancing
the many considerations beyond evidentiary proof that go into deciding
whether presidential removal serves the national interest. Therefore, the
constitution confides the power to impeach and later to convict in political
bodies.
The oft-expressed resistance to idea that the constitutional device of
impeachment is “political” is quite silly. A constitution is, after all, merely
a set of mechanisms and governing principles for ordering politics.
Impeachment is a political tool for correcting a particular type of political
disorder. But, that being so, impeachment’s latent flaw is that, precisely
because it is a political mechanism, it cannot overcome a fundamentally
fractured political culture.
The comparatively sound political culture of late 1970s America –
which included a healthy Republican Party – could wield the threat of
impeachment to remove Richard Nixon. In today’s environment, that
result would be improbable. Nixon would have denied wrongdoing and
claimed political persecution. The (then-nonexistent) right-wing media
machine would have picked up the cry and convinced the Republican base
that the president was a victim of Democratic schemes. Republicans and
pro-Nixon southern Democrats in the Senate would have been afraid to
fight the tempest. And Nixon would have served out his term.
Even the increasingly fractious political culture of the late 1990s
performed better than we might now expect. True, the Republican
majority in the House engaged in the wasteful frivolity of impeaching
President Clinton for lying about sex, but a bipartisan majority of the
Senate was still sound enough to pause, cogitate, and ultimately reject the
extreme sanction of conviction and removal.
The simple explanation of the failure of the two Trump
impeachments is that the corroded, tribal political culture of 2020 and
2021 featured a debased Republican Party subservient to Donald Trump
and to the symbiotic right-wing media complex that upheld him (and still
does). A few principled souls of the President’s party were stout enough
to vote for impeachment or conviction. But not enough. And of those
few, many are now being rewarded for their rectitude with expulsion from
office.12
The second point is that, just as the parlous condition of American
political culture explains the results of the two Trump impeachments, so,
12

Joseph Gedeon, 10 House Republicans voted to impeach Trump. Cheney's loss
means only 2 made it past their primaries., POLITICO (Aug. 13, 2022),
https://www.politico.com/news/2022/08/13/cheney-10-house-republicans-trumpimpeachment-00050991 [https://perma.cc/28XZ-X4BP].
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too, is the failure of those impeachments an ominous sign for the near
future of American constitutionalism. What we think of as the American
constitutional system extends far beyond the constitutional document and
judicial interpretations of it to embrace all the institutions, laws, customs,
and behavioral expectations that over two centuries grew up around the
textual core to shape and regulate public and private life. Indeed, much of
what we instinctively regard as right, proper, or even “constitutional” rests
not on some immutable law, but on norms neither codified nor formally
enforceable.
The persistent lesson of the Trump years was that if a sufficiently
unscrupulous man captures the presidency, and if his subordinates and
political allies are unwilling to restrain him by demanding adherence to
traditional standards of political propriety, then even very old norms can
prove tenuous obstacles to accelerating misconduct. The fact that Trump’s
party could not summon the fortitude to expel him from office during the
first impeachment, or to purge him from public life (and thus from
leadership of their party) the second time around, signaled to a big chunk
of the populace that Trump’s egregious behavior was acceptable for an
American president. And that signal not only weakens the deterrent force
of impeachment, but corrodes the web of personal, popular, and
institutional norms that are, in all but extraordinary cases, the real restraint
on presidential abuses of power.
The deleterious effect of the two acquittals was most acute in the
second case. For months, Trump schemed to reverse the results of a valid
election to keep himself in power. His objective was nothing less than
subversion of the electoral foundation of American constitutional
democracy. Yet his party not only failed to convict – or even rebuke –
him, but has since inverted reality and adopted as credal convictions that
the 2020 election was stolen from Trump, that he was right to seek to
remain in office, and, worst of all, that election results generally are
suspect unless Republicans win.
I am not optimistic that a truly healthy politics can be revived in
America anytime soon. Too many of us have traveled too far down
diverging roads into alternate realities and mutual incomprehension. That
certainly does not mean that we should abandon the effort to heal
ourselves. But it will be a long struggle with an uncertain prospect, and
one in which all of us, Republicans, Democrats and independents alike,
will be obliged to do more than merely snipe at our countrymen.
As for impeachment, until we travel a good distance toward restoring
our national political community, I do not believe that venerable process
is likely to resume its original constitutional function as a practical mode
of presidential removal and thus as the ultimate legislative check on
presidential misconduct. It may, as several participants in this symposium
suggest, remain an occasionally valuable instrument for investigating and
publicizing presidential misconduct. But it may also become a drearily
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familiar avenue for presidential harassment by congressional majorities of
the opposing party (about which more below).
But let me turn from my own dolorous predictions to briefly
introducing the terrific contributions to this volume by our stellar cast of
guest thinkers.
It is only right that I should begin with the thoughts of Michael
Gerhardt, who is surely the dean of impeachment scholars in the United
States.13 His scholarship on impeachment was deeply influential in the
Clinton imbroglio and in both Trump impeachments. Moreover, he has a
unique insider’s perspective, having served as an advisor to elements of
both the House and Senate, not only during three presidential
impeachments, but also the impeachments of several judges.
Professor Gerhardt takes a rather more hopeful view of
impeachment’s future than I have done. He acknowledges the failure of
the two Trump impeachments, and astutely identifies several factors in
addition to those discussed above that contributed to Trump’s acquittal and
may diminish the likelihood of conviction for future presidents. Of special
note is his discussion of the adoption of the unitary executive theory of
presidential power by conservative lawyers and presidents.14
Nonetheless, he views impeachment as having continued utility even
in an era when the chances of conviction are vanishingly small. He
emphasizes that impeachment, even without conviction, is likely to
damage a president’s political standing, not to speak of his historical
legacy, and suggests that these consequences may well serve as a material
deterrent to presidential misconduct.
Of course, deterrence is a subjective phenomenon. Whether the
prospect of impeachment deters depends on lessons future presidents draw
from limited past precedent. For example, the lesson of the Clinton case
is assuredly mixed. On the one hand, President Clinton’s personal
popularity actually rose during his impeachment ordeal. On the other
hand, I have always suspected that this polling result expressed not
increased admiration of a dishonest, philandering president, but a
comparative judgment by the public of Clinton and his Republican
pursuers. Once Clinton was acquitted, there remained an undoubted
stigma. And I have also long suspected that the stain leached onto
Clinton’s Vice President, Al Gore, and contributed to his razor thin, and
deeply controversial, loss in the presidential election of 2000. What
conclusion future presidents will draw from this tangled skein is
anybody’s guess.
Likewise, the magnitude of any deterrent effect will depend mightily
on the psychology of particular presidents. Some will be intensely
sensitive to the anticipated judgment of history. Others will be far more
13
14

Michael Gerhardt, How Impeachment Works, 87 MO. L. REV. 743 (2022).
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focused on the imperatives of attaining policy goals in the short run, and,
if eligible for reelection, winning the next campaign. For a hard-nosed
pragmatist with a short-term focus, impeachment in an era when
conviction is nearly inconceivable is only likely to deter if it has shortterm political costs. This raises the much-debated question of the political
effect of Trump’s first impeachment. At the time, many observers
suggested that impeachment would, in an echo of the Clinton experience,
help Trump’s political fortunes. At a minimum, grave doubts were
expressed about whether impeachment would do Trump any electoral
damage. Such doubts contributed to reservations, even among Trump’s
most ardent critics, about the merits of proceeding with impeachment at
all when the chances of conviction were so remote.
To this day, one cannot say with certainty whether Trump’s first
impeachment contributed to his defeat in 2020. But he was impeached,
and thereafter he did lose. That is an undeniable fact that future presidents
may consider.
Professor Gerhardt next provides an admirable discussion of the
persistent misconduct by the lawyers defending President Trump. I cannot
commend it too strongly, particularly to student or young lawyer readers
of this issue.
Finally, Professor Gerhardt gives us the benefit of his unmatched
personal familiarity with the internal congressional dynamics of
impeachment in the form of a set of reforms to the process that might
improve both outcomes and public perception of the impeachment
process. One can only hope that Congress will have the foresight to
consider these proposals before the next impeachment storm is upon us.
In light of Professor Gerhardt’s modest optimism about the utility of
even unsuccessful presidential impeachments, it is appropriate to mention
next Professor Brian Kalt’s disenchanted discussion of what he calls
“futile impeachments”—those where the prospect of conviction is
recognized to be de minimis from the outset.
Professor Kalt’s academic work was notably influential during the
second Trump impeachment crisis, in no small measure because he had
previously explored the seemingly abstruse question of whether a federal
civil officer could be impeached, tried, or convicted after having left
office. (His views were also much sought-after at the end of President
Trump’s term because, while still in law school, he had presciently
published on the question of whether a president can pardon himself.15)
In this issue, Professor Kalt criticizes “failed and futile presidential
impeachments, but find[s] defensible principles at their core and
suggest[s] that censure offers a better way to vindicate those principles.”16
15

Brian C. Kalt, Note, Pardon Me?: The Constitutional Case Against
Presidential Self-Pardons, 106 YALE L.J. 779 (1996).
16
Brian C. Kalt, Impeachment and Its Discontents, 87 MO. L. REV. 781 (2022).

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol87/iss3/5

12

Bowman: Symposium: The Two Impeachments of Donald J. Trump Foreward: Requ

2022]

REQUIEM FOR IMPEACHMENT?

725

While Professor Kalt offers a characteristically measured, persuasive, and
scholarly argument for his view, I am left with some reservations.
As noted above, I agree with Professor Kalt’s conclusion that
successful impeachment in the sense of an impeachment producing
conviction in the Senate is nearly inconceivable in the present era, which
he admirably characterizes as not a two-party system, but a “two-reality
system.”17 But I am troubled by the plain implication of his opposition to
even initiating impeachment proceedings in such an era—which is that if
the members of president’s party simply declare unwavering allegiance to
their leader, and preemptively announce their refusal to consider
impeachment regardless of the merits of the case, then impeachment must
not even be ventured.
I do not believe that recalcitrance of that sort should be rewarded.
And I do believe that even “unsuccessful” impeachment proceedings can
have salutary effects, not the least of which is that invocation of the
impeachment power strengthens congressional investigative authority.
That said, Professor Kalt’s argument for censure as a plausible alternative
to failed impeachment merits careful consideration.
In a sense, Gene Healy’s contribution to this volume provides some
additional grist for the mill of Professor Kalt’s skepticism about the utility
of impeachments without convictions.18 Mr. Healy, a distinguished
scholar at the Cato Institute, has long expressed a refreshing enthusiasm
for more, not fewer, presidential impeachments. His view, with which I
generally concur, is that presidents ought to be a great deal less imperial
and a good deal more disposable than the encrustations of historical
mythology have made them.
Nonetheless, he notes ruefully that the Senate’s failure to convict a
president impeached for what impartial observers would consider grave
constitutional offenses, can create bad precedent. At a minimum, this can
mean that, in future impeachment cases, the defenders of misbehaving
presidents will claim that the past acquittal represents a senatorial
judgment that the charged conduct was of the wrong type or of insufficient
gravity to constitute impeachable wrongdoing under the constitution.
More generally, and as I observed above, acquittal can be touted to the
general public as not merely technical vindication, but as endorsement of
the view that the president’s charged behavior was no wrong at all, but a
perfectly proper exercise of presidential authority.
Mr. Healy nonetheless retains a somewhat chastened enthusiasm for
impeachment and concludes that impeachment remains an important tool
for restraining presidential overreach.

17

Id. at 789.
Gene Healy, Be Careful What You Wish for: Impeachment in the Trump Era,
87 MO. L. REV. 769 (2022).
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Professor Victoria Nourse adds to this symposium a bracing
discussion of the political character of impeachment and its place in what
she calls the “constitutive constitution,” that is, a constitution whose
function is both to create – to constitute – the structure of national
government as well as to erect “a set of restraints on Congress and the
Presidency.”19 Professor Nourse’s subtle theoretical understanding of the
constitution, together with her own long practical experience working in
Congress, leads her to conclude that there is relatively little danger of a
proliferation of frivolous impeachments. She emphasizes the collective
action problem that confronts Congress when attempting even ordinary
legislative work and emphasizes how much more acute this becomes in an
extraordinary event like an impeachment. She goes on to observe that
even active and aggressive partisans who want either legitimate executive
oversight or politicized show hearings can employ ordinary committee
powers to achieve their ends with far less trouble than is involved in
impeachment. She concludes by summarizing the structural constitutional
disincentives to profligate use of impeachment, including the importance
of geographic representation in the makeup of Congress and, of course,
the two-thirds rule in the Senate.
I confess myself somewhat less sanguine than my good friend,
Professor Nourse. There is a particular vitriol abroad in the land that
seems to reward extremes of rhetoric and political conduct. For those
simmering in that poisonous cauldron, the idea of impeachment of the
other side’s president has a special appeal. Nonetheless, I hope she is right
and that Congress will avoid diverting its scarce resources into vain and
profitless pursuits.
Professor Keith Whittington focuses us on more foundational
questions about impeachment.20 He first lends his considerable erudition
to the conclusion that impeachable “high Crimes and Misdemeanors” are
not limited to indictable crimes, but extend to the conduct of a president
who “egregiously misuses the powers of his office or engages in conduct
grossly incompatible with the dignity of his office.”21 For what little it
may be worth, I could not agree more. And I also share Professor
Whittington’s concern that the Senate’s acquittal verdicts on Trump’s
conduct could have the effect of undercutting the long-existing consensus
on this point.22
Professor Whittington also addresses the constitutional propriety of
the second article of President Trump’s first impeachment which

19
Victoria Nourse, The Constitutional (and Political) Safeguards Against
Impeachment, 87 MO. L. REV. 819 (2022).
20
Keith E. Whittington, Impeachment in a System of Checks and Balances, 87
MO. L. REV. 835 (2022).
21
Id. at 848–49.
22
Id. at 859–60.
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considered his refusal to comply with congressional demands for material
related to its impeachment inquiry. If I read his excellent analysis
correctly, Professor Whittington appears to conclude that impeachment is
constitutionally permissible on this ground, but is also a remedy to be
employed only with careful circumspection and as a last resort.
Finally, Professor Whittington implicitly disagrees with Professor
Kalt’s categorical rejection of impeachments in which the prospect of
conviction and removal is remote. While recognizing the drawbacks of
proceeding in such cases, he also acknowledges other legitimate purposes
for even an unsuccessful venture. As he says, “If President Trump’s
actions were properly within the scope of the impeachment power, then
the House could reasonably decide using the impeachment process to
condemn the President’s actions could be productive even if the President
could not be removed.”23
Finally, I commend the reader’s attention to the finely-wrought
discussion by Professor Michael McConnell of the question much
discussed in President Trump’s second impeachment: whether a civil
officer, including the President, can be impeached or tried, convicted, and
disqualified from future federal service after he or she has left office.
Drawing on careful analysis of the text, structure, and drafting history of
the Constitution, as well as later congressional practice, Professor
McConnell concludes that a constitutional officer can be impeached by the
House while in office, but not after leaving office, and that the Senate can
try – and thus convict – any constitutional officer properly impeached by
the House while he or she was in office.24
I end this introduction to the written portion of the Missouri Law
Review symposium on “The Two Impeachments of Donald Trump” where
I began my oral introduction to our parade of panels months ago, with an
expression of my gratitude to the remarkably distinguished group that
graced our Zoom screens and, now, the pages of this volume. As I said
then, it is no exaggeration to say that this symposium boasted the most
distinguished array of impeachment experts assembled in any venue since
the House Judiciary Committee hearings on the impeachment of President
Clinton in 1998. For their presence, their insights, and the wisdom they
imparted, I offer my thanks.

23
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